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This paper develops and tests a new theoretical explanation for stock repurchases. Investors may 
disagree with the manager about the firm’s investment projects. A repurchase causes a change in the 
investor base as investors who are most likely to disagree with the manager tender their shares. 
Therefore, a firm is more likely to buy back shares when the level of investor-management agreement 
is lower, and agreement improves as a consequence. Moreover, dispersion of opinion among investors 
cannot explain repurchase activity, once the stock price and investor-management agreement are 
controlled for. Overall, the evidence is consistent with firms strategically using repurchases to improve 
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      The past two decades have seen dramatic changes in corporate payout policy. In particular, stock 
repurchases have increased in popularity while the proportion of dividend-paying firms has declined (Fama and 
French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002), and Skinner (2008)).
1
 Although in a Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
world, a firm’s payout mix does not matter for firm value, an interesting question is: what sort of frictions 
would cause a firm to prefer cash disbursement through a share repurchase instead of a dividend? The purpose 
of this paper is to develop a new theoretical explanation for why firms conduct open-market and 
privately-negotiated repurchases, and empirically test the predictions of the theory. 
      The existing literature offers various explanations for why firms repurchase stock (see Allen and 
Michaely (2003) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2008) for a summary). A popular explanation is the 
information asymmetry/signaling hypothesis (see, for example, Constantinides and Grundy (1989), Dann 
(1981), Ofer and Thakor (1987), and Vermaelen (1981)) – a firm buys back shares when its management has 
private information that its stock is undervalued, so the repurchase decision signals this private information. 
Strong empirical support exists for the signaling hypothesis in the context of self-tender offer repurchases.
2
  
      However, in the context of open-market and privately-negotiated repurchases, the signaling story has a 
few holes.
3
 First, with open-market repurchases, all that the market knows is the aggregate amount of 
repurchases approved by the Board of Directors, not the exact timing of the repurchase or how much is being 
                                                        
1
 The 2003 dividend tax cut caused an increase in dividends, but there was also a simultaneous spike in repurchases after 
the tax cut (Chetty and Saez (2005, 2006)). Chetty and Saez (2006) suggest that repurchases may have increased even 
more, absent the tax change. 
2
 For examples, see Asquith and Mullins (1986), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Dann (1981), D’Mello and Shroff (2000), 
Louis and White (2007), and Vermaelen (1981).  
3
 Comment and Jarrell (1991) state that “the bulk of buyback activity is conducted through open-market repurchase 
programs and dutch-auction self-tender offers, methods which have less signaling effectiveness than the conventional 
fixed-price offer. This suggests that most stock buyback activity may be principally motivated by objectives other than (or 
in addition to) signaling stock undervaluation.” Accelerated share repurchase programs, adopted in the last few years, may 
help get around some of these issues. See Bargeron, Kulchania, and Thomas (2011) and Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang 
(2010) for a discussion. 
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repurchased at any point in time.
4
 Theoretically, therefore, it is hard to see how the repurchase could act as a 
signal when investors are not aware of the repurchase when it occurs.
5
 The signaling argument for open-market 
repurchases encounters difficulties from an empirical standpoint as well. For example, Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) find no evidence of post-repurchase operational improvement in firms that announce share repurchase 
programs, which runs counter to the presumed favorable private information possessed by managers prior to the 
repurchases.
6
 Moreover, the survey evidence in Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) suggests that 
managers do not use open-market repurchases as a signaling tool per se. With privately-negotiated repurchases, 
the fact that shares are often repurchased without any premium is also inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis. 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) suggest that such repurchases are mere wealth transfers between the firm and the 
selling shareholders.    
      A second hole in the signaling story is that it suggests that firms tend to repurchase stock during periods 
of low market valuation because that is when undervaluation is most likely. Yet the bull market of 2003-2007 
witnessed large amounts of open-market repurchases, and Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) explicitly show that 
aggregate repurchases go up with stock market valuation. 
      As an alternative to signaling, we build on the prior literature of investor-management disagreement 
(e.g., Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor (2006, 2008), Dittmar and Thakor (2007), and Song and Thakor (2010)) and 
offer a new explanation for open-market and privately-negotiated repurchases. Our explanation is based on the 
                                                        
4
 The literature similarly argues that a problem with considering open-market repurchase programs as costly signals is that 
the programs are not firm commitments and thus the completion rate of these programs varies substantially across 
companies. See, for example, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Rau and Vermaelen (2002).   
5
 Oded (2005) presents an asymmetric information-based signaling model to explain the positive announcement returns of 
open-market repurchase programs. Yet the literature also documents several sources of announcement returns that are 
unrelated to signaling. See Babenko (2009), Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Michaely (2004), and Maxwell and Stephens 
(2003), among others. Further, Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko (forthcoming) suggest that while managers may buy 
stock prior to a repurchase program announcement, such purchases are likely to be motivated by personal wealth 
maximization rather than an intention to convey information. For an asymmetric information justification for open-market 
repurchases that does not involve signaling, see Brennan and Thakor (1990). 
6
 Lie (2005) shows that firms with actual repurchases after open-market repurchase program announcements experience 
improvements in operating performance relative to their control firms. However, Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) suggest that 
the reported improvement in operating performance is likely to be driven by pre-repurchase downward earnings 
management rather than genuine growth in profitability.   
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idea that management can use a repurchase to effect a change in the firm’s investor base. Specifically, we argue 
that different generations of investors may have heterogeneous prior beliefs about the profitability of the firm’s 
future investment opportunities, and this may cause some to agree with management’s decisions and others to 
disagree. For example, some investors may endorse the manager’s view that the firm should diversify into a 
new line of business through acquisitions, while others may view diversification as a bad idea. Management 
would like to invest in all projects it believes have positive NPV. However, because the degree to which 
investors endorse its decisions will affect the firm’s stock price, something management is concerned with, 
managers seek to increase the likelihood of investor endorsement of managerial decisions and hence 
investor-management alignment. An open-market or privately-negotiated repurchase facilitates such alignment 
by providing a mechanism to buy out investors who are more likely to disagree with management and 
concentrating ownership in the hands of investors more likely to agree with management.  
      Notice that even when a firm buys back shares at the market price without any premium, a repurchase 
can serve the purpose of buying out the lowest-agreement investors. This is because at any stock price the 
marginal shareholders who are indifferent between selling and holding their stock are willing to randomize 
between selling and holding, and thus some will sell if there is a buy order at the market price. An open-market 
or privately-negotiated repurchase program creates the buy orders.
7
 Furthermore, due to wealth constraints 
and/or risk aversion, inframarginal investors who agree more with management and thus value the firm above 
its stock price might not absorb all the shares that the marginal investors are willing to sell as part of their 
randomized sell-hold strategy. So the firm’s buyback helps to clear the market.    
      We develop a simple theoretical model based on this intuition. The model leads to three predictions. 
First, the likelihood of a firm undertaking a repurchase is higher when the level of investor-management 
                                                        
7
 Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004) document that open-market repurchases by firms in the US increase the market 
liquidity of repurchasing firms’ stock. Brockman and Chung (2001) present evidence from Hong Kong that open-market 
repurchases reduce liquidity on the day of actual repurchases. 
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agreement is lower. Second, investor-management agreement improves following the repurchase. Third, 
dispersion of opinion among investors does not appear to be a driver of repurchases, once the stock price and 
investor-management agreement are controlled for. Using different measures of investor-management 
agreement, we find strong empirical support for these predictions.   
      Since lower agreement will typically lead to a lower stock price (see Dittmar and Thakor (2007)), the 
implication of our agreement hypothesis may be confounded by the conventional market-timing hypothesis, 
which argues that firms buy back shares when they are undervalued. Our model explicitly incorporates this 
undervaluation component, and shows that a firm’s stock price depends on both the agreement parameter and a 
random source of valuation that is unrelated to agreement. The expected benefit from repurchasing is 
determined by both the change in agreement and the prior firm valuation. That is, there are two effects at work: 
a capital gain from repurchasing stock at a low price (market timing) and an increase in agreement from 
removing relatively low-valuation investors via repurchases (disagreement reduction). The results of our 
empirical analysis confirm that the effect of disagreement on repurchases persists even after controlling for the 
stock price (the market timing influence). 
      In addition, while open-market or privately-negotiated repurchases are not likely to be motivated by 
signaling, one may argue that they could nonetheless be driven by some non-signaling-related information 
asymmetry. For example, investors may suspect managers of engaging in the extraction of private benefits and 
may overestimate or underestimate the negative valuation impact of this, getting it right only on average but 
believing that they are always right about the valuation impact. Managers, possessing superior information, 
always assess the valuation impact correctly. When investors overestimate the negative valuation impact, the 
stock is undervalued, so management responds by repurchasing stock. In contrast, if investors underestimate the 
negative valuation impact, the manager may either do nothing or sell his own stockholding.         
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      Note that the information asymmetry hypothesis posits that this effect arises from investors having 
access to different information sets. By contrast, our hypothesis is that disagreement arises because investors 
assess information in different ways. In particular, we argue that differences in investors’ interpretations arise 
from heterogeneous prior beliefs, which cannot be reconciled even in the absence of information asymmetry. 
Some investors’ beliefs are aligned with management’s, but others are not. Further, the arrival of information 
through time in a given firm helps to mitigate the information asymmetry between management and investors. 
Agreement, however, does not necessarily improve with the mitigation of information asymmetry.  
      We empirically distinguish our agreement hypothesis from this information-asymmetry argument in 
various ways. First, we rely on firm-fixed-effect estimation, wherever appropriate, to utilize within-firm 
variation in examining a firm’s decision to repurchase. This diminishes the likelihood of picking up information 
asymmetry effects that would be expected to be more pronounced in a cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, we 
run an empirical horse race by including in the regressions two measures of information asymmetry that are 
unrelated to investor-management disagreement: the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns and the standard 
deviation of earnings announcement abnormal returns over a prior period. Second, we test the different 
implications of these two hypotheses. 1) Our disagreement hypothesis predicts that, for any fixed repurchase 
size, the improvement in agreement should be greater if the demand curve of the firm’s shares is more 
inelastic.
8
 However, under the information asymmetry hypothesis, all investors are equally concerned about 
managerial rent seeking and thus the demand curve is flat. As a result, there is no predicted impact on 
agreement due to the repurchase. 2) Our model implies a greater investor propensity to endorse management 
decisions which arises from the increase in agreement induced by the repurchase. The market can thus be 
expected to respond positively to the repurchase announcement in anticipation of the improvement in agreement, 
                                                        
8
 Cross-sectional heterogeneity among investors in their extent of agreement with the managers leads to an imperfectly 
elastic demand curve for shares. 
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and this response should be greater the lower the initial agreement. Also, repurchasing firms should experience 
positive abnormal returns in the long run subsequent to the repurchases being conducted and the improvement 
in agreement being realized. Under the information asymmetry hypothesis, repurchases do not change investor 
valuation of management decisions and the firms unless they are a credible signal (but as discussed earlier, they 
are not). The results strongly support our disagreement hypothesis.   
      Our paper is related to the shareholder heterogeneity argument of Bagwell (1991b, 1992) that firms face 
upward-sloping supply curves for their shares since cross-sectional heterogeneity among investors in their 
extent of agreement with managerial decisions can generate such supply curves. Bagwell (1991a) argues 
theoretically that a stock repurchase can be used as a takeover deterrent. As shareholders with the lowest 
valuations tender their shares, the repurchase skews the distribution of remaining shareholders and makes the 
takeover more expensive. Stulz (1988) similarly shows that management can repurchase shares to increase the 
fraction of votes it controls, with the increase in control contributing to firm value by increasing the premium 
offered in the event of a hostile takeover attempt. In our paper, shareholders are heterogeneous in the sense that 
they have different propensities to agree with management. While this notion of dispersion of opinion among 
investors is critical to our theory, a key distinguishing feature of our research is that we show that it is 
investor-management disagreement, and not disagreement among investors, that provides an impetus for 
repurchases. Using the empirically-supported idea that dispersion of investor opinion, combined with short-sale 
constraints, may lead to firm overvaluation (Miller (1977), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2002), and Diether (2004)), we distinguish between the two related notions. We show that, holding 
investor-management disagreement fixed, dispersion of investor opinion is negatively related to a firm’s 
repurchase decision due to the overvaluation effect. Thus, ours is the first paper to document 
investor-management disagreement as a statistically and economically important driver of repurchases.    
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      A second strand that our paper is related to is the literature that examines a firm’s preference for 
repurchases in its payout mix. Studies such as Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan, Stephens, and 
Weisbach (2000) argue that firms prefer to use repurchases rather than dividends to adjust payouts in response 
to transitory cash flow shocks, as repurchases are relatively flexible compared to the more rigid payout 
commitments of dividends. Other papers relate the surge in repurchases to the increased use of stock options to 
compensate management and employees (e.g., Babenko (2009), Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002), and 
Weisbenner (2004)). We control for these well-documented factors and find that the effect of disagreement on a 
firm’s repurchase decision persists. Like us, Gaspar, Massa, Matos, Patgiri, and Rehman (2012) also link 
shareholder characteristics to the share repurchase decision. They suggest that firms repurchase to cater to the 
payout policy preference of short-term oriented institutional investors. That paper’s empirical approach – the 
estimation of the investment horizon as the inverse of the turnover of institutional investors – is in the spirit of 
our use of mutual fund holdings as a proxy for the breadth of ownership of a stock. However, the focus of that 
paper is on how the characteristics of investors impinge on the repurchase decision, and they do not examine 
the impact of disagreement between investors and management. This disagreement, which is our focus, reflects, 
at least in part, the characteristics of management.    
      A third strand of the literature to which our paper contributes is that on the corporate finance and 
contracting implications of disagreement based on differences in beliefs. See, for example, Allen and Gale 
(1999), Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor (2006, 2008), Boot and Thakor (2011), Coval and Thakor (2005), Dittmar 
and Thakor (2007), Garmaise (2001), Kandel and Pearson (1995), Song and Thakor (2007, 2010), Thakor 
(2012), Thakor and Whited (2011), and Van den Steen (2004, 2010a, b).   
      The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our paper’s theory and testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables used in the empirical tests. Section 4 presents our 
10 
 
main analysis on management-investor disagreement. Section 5 distinguishes our disagreement hypothesis from 
the information asymmetry hypothesis. In section 6 we conduct additional robustness checks. Section 7 
concludes. Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. 
2. Theory and Empirical Predictions 
      Imagine a firm whose manager makes decisions that affect the firm’s value. The firm is publicly traded 
in a market in which no short sales are allowed. The manager always seeks to make decisions that maximize 
firm value, but investors may disagree that a particular decision is value-maximizing. If investors agree with the 
manager’s decision, they value the firm at VG + ε, and if they disagree, they value the firm at VB + ε < VG + ε, 
where ε is a random source of noise in the investor’s valuation of the firm that is uncorrelated with the 
decision-linked source of value (VG or VB). It is assumed that, for a randomly-chosen investor,        with 
probability 0.5 and       with probability 0.5. The probability that investor group i will agree with the 
manager is   . Thus, investor j in group i assign a value   
 
 to the firm, where  
  
 
=   VG + (    ) VB +   
 
 
with   
            . Whereas all investors in group i have the same   , each investor within any group 
randomly draws one of the two values of  , with the specified probabilities.    
      Due to wealth endowment constraints, risk aversion, or both, each investor group holds a limited 
fraction of the firm’s shares. In equilibrium the firm will therefore be held by investors with different agreement 
parameters,    . The lowest agreement parameter will be that of the marginal group of investors, with 
inframarginal investors having higher values of   . It is clear that   
 
 is strictly increasing in   for any j. 
      For simplicity, assume that the amount of wealth invested in the firm by any investor group is the same 
across all investor groups that are long in the stock,
9
 and that the distribution of the mass of investors is 
                                                        
9
 This assumption is reasonable if investors are risk neutral and wealth constrained with equal wealth endowments. More 
generally, we would expect investors with higher  ’s to invest more. However, the results are even stronger under the latter 
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uniform across                   , where    is the   of the marginal investor in the stock and      is 
the    of the investor with the highest    in the stock. Also assume, for simplicity, that the     in 
               are evenly spaced apart, so that                    , and that         
     . Dropping the superscript j, the firm’s stock price will then be: 
   V0 =   VG + (    ) VB +                                   (1) 
where   is the idiosyncratic portion of valuation for the marginal investor within the    group. 
      At this point, it is useful to pause and interpret the two key parameters of the model:   and  . The 
agreement parameter   represents the degree of alignment or agreement between management and investors. 
That is, as in Boot and Thakor (2011) and Dittmar and Thakor (2007), it represents the probability with which 
investors will endorse a decision that management believes is value enhancing. The firm’s stock price is 
increasing in the value of this parameter for the marginal investor. The parameter   represents dispersion of 
opinion about firm value among investors who all have the same degree of alignment with management.  
      If the firm repurchases stock at the prevailing market price V0 or a slightly higher price, the first 
shareholders to sell will be the marginal investors with   =   . Note that the marginal investors are indifferent 
between selling the stock and not selling it, so they will randomize across selling and holding. We assume that 
some fraction f           of the marginal investors will sell. As the firm repurchases larger amounts, it will have 
to pay higher prices in order to induce investors with higher value of   to sell, given our assumption that there is 
a limited number of investors of any   who are long in the stock and can thus sell. Suppose the firm has to 
invest $C in repurchasing stock to increase the   of the marginal investors from    to   , with an improvement 
of    defined as: 
  (C,   ) =       .                                   (2) 




      Let B(  ) be the benefit to the firm of increasing the   of the marginal investors by   , and          
the expected value of this benefit. We can write      as: 
        =               – V0 – τ                        (3) 
where V0 is defined in (1) above, τ > 0 is a fixed transaction cost of repurchasing stock, and  
   (  +   ) =   VG + (    ) VB +                         (4) 
so               =   VG + (    ) VB, which means we can write (3) as: 
                                         =                –   – τ                     (5) 
Note from (5) that          depends on the change in agreement       and the actual value of   
associated with V0. That is, there are two effects at work: (i) a wealth transfer benefit from repurchasing stock at 
too low a price when       (the market-timing hypothesis), and (ii) an increase in investor-management 
agreement via the repurchase due to the exit of low-valuation investors.  
      We assume that there are diminishing returns to scale in the investment C made in improving  . That is, 
if C(j, j+1) is the amount that must be spent on a repurchase to increase the marginal investor’s   from    to 
    , then given the equal-spacing assumption about the    , diminishing marginal returns imply C(j, j+1) < 
C(k, k+1)     .  
      Viewing C as an investment in the repurchase, the firm chooses C to maximize its net benefit from the 
repurchase: 
        π =         – C.                                    (6) 
Now consider a firm whose marginal investor has agreement    and let C0 be the optimal value of C for this 
firm. Let the resulting agreement parameter of the marginal investor after the repurchase be    . Thus,  
                                    =                 – C0    – τ.                     (7) 
Next consider another firm whose marginal investor has agreement   
    , and suppose this firm also spends 
13 
 
C0 on repurchasing stock. Then, for this firm: 
                                    
  =     
    
          – C0    – τ                     (8) 
where    
 is the agreement parameter of the marginal investor in this firm after the repurchase. It is clear that: 
                                            
                                           (9) 
since   
     and there are diminishing marginal returns in repurchasing stock to improve agreement. This 
implies that           
     
 .  
      Thus, the first prediction of the model is that, controlling for the amount of money spent in the 
repurchase, the higher is the level of pre-repurchase agreement, the smaller is the post-repurchase improvement 
in agreement. To examine the implication of this for the likelihood of a repurchase, suppose       , i.e., it is 
optimal for the firm with the agreement of the marginal investor of    to increase its agreement parameter by 
only one notch. Then, the firm with the pre-repurchase agreement parameter of   
  would be unable to increase 
its agreement parameter by even one notch if it spends the same amount C0 on a repurchase. Thus, a firm is 
more likely to undertake a repurchase when agreement is lower. Since a firm’s stock price depends on both the 
agreement parameter   and the idiosyncratic portion of valuation  , the effect of agreement on the 
repurchasing decision will persist even after controlling for the stock price. 
      The second prediction that is evident is that the level of agreement improves following a repurchase. 
This follows directly from the structure of the model and the above analysis. 
      We have assumed that no short sales are allowed. With such restrictions, the supply of shares at any time 
is smaller than it would be without such restrictions, so the agreement parameter of the marginal investor,   , is 
higher with these restrictions. If the short-sale constraint is lifted, there will be an additional supply of shares 
for sale in the market at any price, implying that the marginal   will be lower, leading to a lower (equilibrium) 




      It is also useful to return to the roles of the agreement parameter   and the idiosyncratic valuation 
parameter  . Suppose there was no disagreement (i.e.     for all investors), then (1) becomes 
                                         V0 = VG +  .                               (10)   
All that is left now is dispersion of opinion among investors, as captured by  , and (7) becomes:                                                   
                                        π = – C0    – τ.                                 (11) 
If      , it may still pay for the firm to do a limited repurchase to buy out the marginal investors with 
      and achieve the corresponding gain in stock price as long as     . This is the familiar market 
timing argument that was discussed in the Introduction. But it is apparent from a comparison of (7) and (11) 
that the extent of repurchasing will be lower when there is no investor-management disagreement. Moreover, if 
    , a repurchase will not occur. Thus, the third prediction of the model is that when there is only dispersion 
of opinion among investors but no difference of opinion between the manager and investors, repurchasing 
activity will be dampened and may vanish altogether.  
      The above analysis leads to the following testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: A firm is more likely to undertake a repurchase when its investor-management agreement 
is lower. 
Hypothesis 2: Investor-management agreement improves following a repurchase. 
Hypothesis 3: Dispersion of opinion among investors, controlling for the stock price and the level of 
manager-investor agreement, cannot explain significant repurchase activity. That is, once the stock price 
and manager-investor agreement are controlled for, higher dispersion of opinion among investors does 
not lead to significantly higher repurchase activity.  
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3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Data, Sample, and Variable Construction 
      We construct our initial sample by starting with all US firms in COMPUSTAT from 1987 to 2010 that 
list their common stock in NYSE, Nasdaq, or AMEX. We omit all utility and financial firms whose primary SIC 
classification is between 4900 and 4999 and between 6000 and 6999, respectively. We require that a firm’s main 
annual accounting, stock return, and agreement proxy data be available during a sample year for it to be 
included in the sample. We obtain firm-level accounting data from COMPUSTAT, return data from CRSP, 
repurchase announcement data from SDC, mutual fund holding data from CDA/Spectrum, analysts’ earnings 
forecast data from IBES, monthly short interest data from Compustat and Nasdaq, and managerial ownership 
and unexercised options data from ExecuComp. Data of shareholder proxy proposals (1996-2010), and 
shareholder voting as well as ISS recommendations in director elections (2003-2010) are from Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS).
10
 In cases where the company CUSIP is missing in the shareholder proxy proposal 
dataset, we manually search it from Compustat and CRSP using the reported company name. We follow Del 
Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) and search through LexisNexis and Factiva to collect data on shareholders’ 
“just vote no” campaign whereby activists encourage their fellow shareholders to withhold votes toward a 
director’s election from 2004 to 2010.11 As we discuss below, our final sample size varies with different 
agreement proxies due to different degrees of data availability.       
      As our main variables, we use four proxies for investor-management agreement: (i) whether a firm 
receives proxy proposals in a year; (ii) vote recommendation in directors’ elections; (iii) actual voting that 
director candidates receive in director elections; (iv) dual-class control premium. We also use a set of control 
variables. These are: firm size, operating income, non-operating income, market-to-book, capital expenditure, 
                                                        
10
 We thank Stuart Gillan for sharing the shareholder proxy proposal data from 1987 to 1995. 
11
 We thank Diane Del Guercio for the helpful discussion on “just vote no” campaigns and the data on this for 2003. 
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debt ratio, and stock returns. All have been used in the prior stock repurchase literature (e.g., Dittmar (2000), 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), and Guay and Harford (2000)). Details on definitions of all 
variables can be seen in the Appendix. In order to reduce the impact of outliers, we follow the literature and 




 percentiles.  
3.2. Summary statistics       
      Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics on the four measures of investor-management agreement. 
For the 16295 firm-years (1198 firms) with available proxy proposal data during 1987-2010, an average firm 
receives proxy proposal(s) once every five years. On average, 9% of the director candidates in a firm-year have 
been recommended “withhold” or “against” votes by ISS or/and shareholder activists in the sample of 14828 
firm-years (2546 firms) from 2003 to 2010. In the average 66% cases for the sample of 9748 firm-years (2351 
firms) during 2003-2010, firms have at least one director candidate’s votes received lower than the sample 
median of the year. For the 141 firms with traded dual-class stocks, the mean (median) control premium of the 
superior stocks is 0.03 (0.01).  
      As discussed above, the samples of different agreement measures do not overlap perfectly. Thus, we 
choose the most complete sample during 1987-2010 – namely, the shareholder proxy proposal sample – in 
reporting the repurchase and firm characteristics. As shown in Panel B, an average firm makes net repurchases 
once every three years, and it spends an amount as much as 4.3% (median 2.4%) of the firm’s prior-year-end 
book value of total assets on each repurchase. Other firm characteristics for the sample firms are comparable 
with those in the literature.  
4. Empirical Analysis: Investor-management Disagreement       
      This section discusses empirical tests of our three hypotheses, and, conditional on the decision to 
repurchase, a firm’s choice of mode: open-market or privately-negotiated repurchases. 
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4.1. Tests of Hypothesis 1 
      To test this hypothesis, we run logistic regressions of a firm’s repurchase decision on the pre-repurchase 
agreement parameters as well as a set of control variables. More specifically, our examination is based on the 
following baseline model:  
              Repurchase i,t = α + β1 * Agreement i,t-1 + β2 * Controls i,t-1 + ηt + εi,t                  (12) 
The dependent variable Repurchase i,t is a dummy that equals one if firm i makes positive net repurchases in 
year t and zero otherwise. We measure repurchase using a dummy variable to reflect the prediction of the model 
that firms with lower agreement parameters are more likely to undertake repurchases.
12
 Nevertheless, we also 
use the expense of repurchase (denominated by book value of total assets as of the year beginning) as the 
dependent variable and the results generally hold. The independent variables include a proxy for the agreement 
parameter for firm i in year t-1, as well as a set of control variables for firm i in year t-1. The control variables 
are those listed earlier in Section 3.1. Our primary interest is in examining whether the estimated coefficients on 
our agreement parameters are statistically significant and economically meaningful. We include yearly and 
industry dummies in the regressions, and robust standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level. Note 
that the independent variables are lagged one period relative to the dependent variable since it is the agreement 
parameter in place at the end of the previous period that drives the repurchase decision this period. 
      As discussed in the Appendix, when proxy proposal is used as an agreement proxy, in our sampling we 
take firms that have experienced at least one proxy proposal submission during the sample years. Similarly, we 
include firms that are covered by ISS when using director election in constructing the other two main agreement 
proxies. Thus, there might be an omitted variable concern that any unobserved firm-specific factors might be 
driving both the repurchase decision and the level of agreement. It could potentially confound the interpretation 
                                                        
12
 Skinner (2008) suggests that the overall level of repurchases is determined by earnings while other factors help explain 
the timing of repurchases. 
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of the findings in the cross-sectional logistic regressions. We address this concern by running a firm-fixed-effect 
estimation of a firm’s repurchase decision, using a linear probability model. This approach eliminates the 
impact of any unobserved firm-specific factors in exploiting the within-firm variations of the variables over 
time. Of course, we are aware of the linearity limitation involved in this linear probability analysis. As such, we 
take the firm-fixed-effect estimation as an ancillary approach when the dependent variable is a discrete choice, 
and report the results in the benchmark analysis only (Table 2).       
      Table 2 presents the baseline results of the firm-fixed-effect estimations (odd columns) and the logistic 
regressions (even columns, coefficients of the marginal effect are reported). The estimated coefficients of the 
four (dis)agreement proxies are statistically significant, and are consistent with the prediction of our agreement 
hypothesis. The results hold after controlling for prior stock returns and market-to-book ratio, proxies for firms’ 
market-timing incentive. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, firms are more likely to buy back shares when the 
investor-management agreement is lower. According to the odds ratios obtained from the logistic regressions, 
the odds of a repurchase are, 15.9% higher following a shareholder proxy proposal and 27.5% higher after one 
or more director candidates receive a below-the-median “for” votes in the director election, than the odds of a 
repurchase otherwise. Also, there are about 5.5% and 176.6% increase in the odds of a repurchase for a standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of director candidates receiving “vote no” recommendations and in the 
dual-class control premium, respectively.
13
 These magnitudes are economically significant. The magnitudes of 
the coefficients obtained from the firm-fixed-effect estimations are comparable with those of the coefficients of 
marginal effects from the logistic regressions.       
      Consistent with the literature, the estimated coefficients on the other explanatory variables display the 
predicted signs and are statistically significant. In particular, a firm is more likely to buy back shares when it 
                                                        
13
 The associated odds ratios from the logistic regressions are 1.263 and 11.773, respectively. 
19 
 
experiences poorer prior stock returns, as suggested by the results from logistic regressions. Also, the likelihood 
of a repurchase increases in a firm’s “permanent” cash flows, “transitory” cash flows, and firm size, and 
decreases in a firm’s capital expenditures and leverage. Overall, we find that firms buy back shares when they 
face relatively low investor-management agreement. This finding is robust to controlling for other factors that 
have been shown by the prior literature to affect a firm’s repurchase decision.                      
4.2. Tests of Hypothesis 2 
      We test this hypothesis by examining how the changes in the agreement proxies are affected by a firm’s 
repurchase based on the following specification: 
        Change in Agreement i,t-1 to t+1 = α + β1* Repurchase i,t + β2 * Controls (+ μi) + ηt + εi,t         (13) 
where Repurchase i,t represents the amount of expense on the repurchase (repurchase expense), normalized by 
firm i’s book value of total assets at the year beginning, if the firm conducts a repurchase in year t. Intuitively, 
the improvement in agreement is greater when the firm buys back more shares, ceteris paribus. If firm i does 
not repurchase shares in year t, this measure is taken as zero. Change in Agreement i,t-1 to t+1 measures the change 
in agreement from the year prior (year t–1) to the year subsequent (year t+1) to the repurchase. We explain 
below in more detail on how we construct this dependent variable.       
      Consider the proxy proposal dummy first. The change-in-agreement variable is defined as a dummy, 
which equals one if the proxy proposal dummy takes the value of zero in year t+1 and one in year t–1, 
representing an improvement in agreement, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the agreement, in the case of actual 
voting in director election being the agreement proxy, is supposed to be improved if no director candidates 
receive lower votes than the sample median in the director election in year t+1 while at least one candidate has 
below-the-sample-median votes in year t-1. As such, it is also defined as a dummy that equals one if the 
agreement improves from t-1 to t+1, and zero otherwise. For the other two agreement proxies – vote 
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recommendation and dual-class control premium – which are continuous as defined, the change in agreement is 
the simple difference from year t-1 to year t+1.  
      When the change-in-agreement is defined as a dummy variable, as is the case for the former two, we 
apply a logistic model in estimating the effect of the repurchase (and coefficients of the marginal effect are 
reported), and we expect a significantly positive impact. For the latter two continuous change-in-agreement 
variables, we employ a firm-fixed-effect estimation, and we expect that repurchase expense should contribute 
negatively to the change in agreement. The yearly and industry dummies are included in all regressions, and 
robust standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level in the logistic regressions and at the firm level in 
the firm-fixed-effect regressions.  
      The results presented in Table 3 strongly support Hypothesis 2. The coefficients of the repurchase 
expense have the expected signs for all four agreement proxies, and are statistically significant. It suggests that 
the post-repurchase agreement improves and the improvement is greater when firms buy back more shares. Our 
theory also suggests that improvement in agreement is greater, controlling for the amount spent in the 
repurchase, if the pre-repurchase agreement is lower. We thus conduct an adjusted regression by adding the 




4.3 Open-market vs. Privately-negotiated Repurchases 
       The analysis so far takes repurchases as a whole without differentiating between open-market and 
privately-negotiated repurchases. It is reasonable to argue that our agreement theory may fit better with private 
repurchases than open-market repurchases, especially when the marginal investor holds a large block of shares. 
                                                        
14
 One concern arises that improvement in agreement might be negatively related to the pre-repurchase agreement 
mechanically in our empirical study due to the limitation in using proxies for agreement. For instance, in the case of 
shareholder proxy proposal as an agreement proxy, the marginal effect of the incidence of receiving a proxy proposal in 
one year on the incidence of receiving a proposal again in the following years might be well less than one, because 
shareholders do not submit proposals frequently. As such, we focus on the analysis based on the specification (13). 
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Inframarginal investors, due to their wealth constraints/risk-aversion, may not absorb all shares (given the large 
size) that the marginal blockholder is willing to sell as she randomizes between selling and holding. Also, both 
the blockholder and the firm may wish to avoid the stock price pressure imposed by a large block selling on the 
market. Instead, the blockholder may split the block into small transactions while selling. But such an approach 
is not very efficient from the standpoint of a manager wishing to increase agreement. As a result, conditional on 
the decision to repurchase to improve agreement, management may prefer to buy back the whole block of 
shares owned by the disagreeing blockholder through private negotiations. 
      To account for management preference for private repurchases relative to open-market repurchases, we 
modify the baseline analysis by employing an ordered logistic model with the dependent variable being 2 for 
private repurchases, 1 for open-market repurchases, and 0 for no repurchases. As discussed in the Appendix, we 
determine that a firm makes private repurchases in a given year if it announces private repurchases exclusively 
in that year as reported in SDC; and that a firm makes open-market repurchases in a given year if the 
Compustat-based measure of net repurchases is positive but no private repurchases (as well as self-tender or 
Dutch auction repurchases) are exclusively reported in that year. The regression results reported in Table 4 
confirms the conjecture about the firm’s choice discussed above. The coefficients of all four agreement proxies 
are significantly positive, suggesting that private repurchases are preferred to open-market repurchases when 
the agreement parameter is low and firms decide to repurchase to improve agreement. 
      One caveat with our examination pertains to the identification of privately-negotiated repurchases. 
Consistent with the literature, we construct the sample of private repurchases from cases where firms announce 
exclusively that targeted repurchases through private negotiations are conducted. But firms also often announce 
repurchase programs without specifying the repurchase mode. Such announcements typically state somewhat 
ambiguously that the firms will buy back shares on the open market and through private negotiations. We could 
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thus fail to account for those privately-negotiated repurchases that are announced simultaneously with 
open-market repurchases and do occur later. As such, we do not distinguish private repurchases from 
open-market repurchases and adopt the Compustat-based measure of net repurchases (while excluding 
self-tender and Dutch auction repurchases) throughout the rest of the paper. 
4.4. Tests of Hypothesis 3 
      As we discussed in the Introduction, the notion of investor-management disagreement is related to the 
shareholder heterogeneity argument of Bagwell (1991a, 1991b, 1992) that firms face upward-sloping supply 
curves for their shares.
15
 In our paper, shareholder heterogeneity is due to different propensities on the part of 
investors to agree with management. The theory requires not only that investors disagree with management, but 
also that different groups of investors have different levels of agreement with management. That is, there must 
also be differences among investors about the extent to which they disagree with management. If investors 
disagreed with management but were homogenous in that they always agreed with each other, the firm would 
gain nothing from a repurchase. But even investors who are homogenous in terms of their propensity to agree 
with management may disagree with each other on other dimensions that are value-relevant. Such differences of 
opinion, which relate to the ε in our model, are not relevant for the repurchase decision in our analysis, which 
we will test in this section. The question is: how do we empirically disentangle investor-management 
disagreement from differences of opinion among investors unrelated to their propensity to endorse management 
decisions? 
      Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), and Diether (2004) show that 
dispersion of opinion among investors combined with short-sale constraints that keep pessimistic investors out 
of the market can lead to higher prices and lower subsequent returns (Miller (1977)). This implies that, even 
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 Gay, Kale, and Noe (1996) derive and test an optimal shareholder bidding strategy under shareholder heterogeneity in a 
Dutch auction share repurchase.  
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apart from our theory, a firm is less likely to repurchase its shares when they are overvalued. To distinguish the 
effect of disagreement from that of this kind of dispersion of opinion, we take the two approaches described 
below.  
      First, we directly control for the joint effect of dispersion of opinion and short-sale constraints by 
including in the baseline regressions an interaction of the proxies for the two factors. Following the prior 
literature, we use analysts’ forecast dispersion as a proxy for dispersion of opinion among investors and short 
interest as a proxy for the short-sale constraints. A stock is more difficult to short at the margin when there is a 
higher level of observed short interest. This is because the unobserved demand for short sales increases as the 
observed short interest rises (Figlewski (1981)). D’Avolio (2002) and Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) 
find that the average cost of shorting a security increases with the level of short interest, so the short-sale 
constraints related to a security can be viewed as being tighter when a higher level of short interest in the 
security is observed. We follow the standard practice of scaling the short interest by the number of shares 
outstanding, and take the monthly average of this ratio as an annual observation.  
      Second, to conduct an additional test, we follow Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) and include in the 
baseline regressions a different proxy for dispersion of opinion among investors – breadth of ownership. 
Specifically, this proxy, labeled as Breadth of ownership, is defined as the number of mutual funds that hold a 
long position in the stock in the quarter as of (or immediately before) the fiscal year end, divided by the total number 
of all available mutual funds reporting in the same quarter. This variable proxies for dispersion of opinion among 
institutional investors – as this dispersion increases, breadth decreases. This proxy has little to do with 
investor-management disagreement.
16
 It also has another advantage in our test of the relation between 
dispersion of opinion and the repurchase decision. Our analysis in Section 2 suggests that restrictions on 
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 Recent papers, for instance, Dittmar and Thakor (2007) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007), also use this 
proxy for diversity of opinion among investors.     
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short-sales can dampen the repurchase incentive. One may argue that the overvaluation implication of 
dispersion of opinion may depend on the restrictiveness of the short-sale constraints (see our first approach). 
But this is not much of a concern in this second approach, because this proxy is constructed based on mutual 
fund ownership, and mutual funds are typically short-sale constrained.  
      The results of the logistic regressions are presented in Table 5. They support the hypothesis that it is 
investor-management disagreement, rather than dispersion of opinion among investors that is unrelated to their 
propensity to agree with management, that motivates a firm’s repurchase decision. The results on all agreement 
proxies continue to hold with the inclusion of the two proxies for dispersion of opinion among investors. 
Moreover, controlling for investor-management disagreement, a greater dispersion of opinion among investors, 
combined with short-sale constraints, is associated with a lower likelihood of a repurchase, consistent with our 
theory. The coefficients of Breadth of ownership are positive and statistically significant in the samples when 
the three main agreement proxies are used.
17
 The coefficients of the interaction term of Analysts’ forecast 
dispersion and Short interest are significantly negative. The results also suggest that our agreement proxies 
capture the effect of disagreement between investors and management beyond that generated by differences of 
opinion among investors unrelated to endorsement of management decisions. The other control variables in the 
baseline regressions are also included but are not reported here to conserve space.     
5. Distinguishing Disagreement from Information Asymmetry     
      As we have discussed in the introduction, the information asymmetry/signaling hypothesis is not 
successful in explaining open-market and private repurchase either theoretically or empirically. Yet, one could 
tell a non-signaling related information asymmetry story to explain a firm’s repurchase decision. Consider the 
following example. A manager decides to invest in a positive-NPV project after doing her due diligence. 
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 It is negative but insignificant in the sample of firms when dual-class control premium is used as an agreement proxy.  
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Investors, however, are uninformed about the value of the project, and believe that the project has negative NPV 
and is being chosen because it produces private benefits for the manager. The stock price thus drops. The 
manager decides to repurchase the undervalued stock because she has her own equity interest in the firm. This 
“information asymmetry” story is not necessarily about signaling, but has implications similar to our 
disagreement hypothesis with respect to the negative stock returns prior to the repurchase. We have shown 
above both theoretically and empirically that the effect of disagreement on the repurchase decision persists after 
controlling for the prior stock returns. Here we further delineate our agreement hypothesis from this information 
asymmetry story more specifically. 
      Theoretically, the difference between these two stories relates to the conjectured source of disagreement: 
under the information asymmetry hypothesis, disagreement arises from access to different information sets, 
whereas under the disagreement hypothesis, the source is heterogeneous prior beliefs. Empirically, we conduct 
several discriminating tests on this basis. First, we run an empirical horse race by including in the baseline 
regressions two measures of information asymmetry that are unlikely to be confounded by a link with our main 
agreement proxies, and see if these measures have significant impact on the repurchase decision and how the 
baseline results on our agreement proxies may be affected. Second, the two hypotheses have distinct 
implications on the post-repurchase change in agreement and consequently, firm valuation. We therefore 
examine how agreement and firm valuation may be affected differently after repurchases under the two 
hypotheses.  
5.1. Proxies for Information Asymmetry 
      As we describe below, we use two proxies for information asymmetry that have been widely used in the 
literature. The first, labeled as Volatility, is the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns (e.g., Dierkens 
(1991), Ferreira and Laux (2007), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
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Stulz (2007)). It is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model regression of the daily 
stock returns for all trading days in a year.
18
 The second, Earnings residual (std), is measured as the standard 
deviation of all three-day (–1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around earnings announcements over 
the past five years (e.g., Dierkens (1991), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2007)). The earnings announcement dates are obtained from I/B/E/S and a minimum of four 
announcements is required to compute the CARs’ standard deviation. We estimate the CARs using the CRSP 
equally weighted index and the market model, where the parameters for the market model are estimated over 
the (–205, –6) day interval.19 
      For either of the two information asymmetry measures, we first regress the repurchase decision on the 
measure alone, and then conduct a second regression that includes both the measure of interest and our 
agreement proxies. The information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that the likelihood of repurchase increases 
in the two measures of information asymmetry. In all regressions we include the control variables used in the 
baseline regressions in Table 2, but we do not report them to conserve space. The results, obtained using the 
logistic model in all regressions, are presented in Table 6.       
      We find no evidence that this revised information asymmetry story is driving repurchases. Instead, the 
coefficients of both information asymmetry measures are significantly negative in all samples except that of the 
dual-class control premium. However, the results on our agreement proxies hold even after controlling for the 
information asymmetry measures. Furthermore, we find that the inclusion of our agreement proxies does not 
alter the economic or statistical significance of the two information asymmetry measures in a significant way. 
                                                        
18
 The idea behind this variable is that informed trading induces volatility (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and French 
and Roll (1986)), and idiosyncratic price changes mainly reflect private information being incorporated into stock prices by 
informed trading (Roll (1988)). See Ferreira and Laux (2007) for a reference of empirical evidence in support of this 
informational interpretation of idiosyncratic volatility. 
19
 Intuitively, strong positive or negative reactions by the market around information-revealing events such as earning 
announcements suggest a high information asymmetry between management and investors. As such, as in Dierkens (1991), 
the dispersion in the market reactions over a period is used as a proxy for information asymmetry.  
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More importantly, the inclusion of the asymmetric information proxies does not affect the economic or 
statistical significance of the agreement measures. 
5.2. Implications for Post-repurchase Agreement       
5.2.1 Impact of Elasticity of Demand Curve on Improvement in Agreement 
      In Section 4.2, we distinguished our disagreement hypothesis from the asymmetric information story by 
documenting that agreement improves following a repurchase. We now conduct a further test to see how the 
post-repurchase change in agreement is affected by the demand elasticity for the firm’s shares.  
      The disagreement hypothesis, which posits a negatively-sloped share demand curve, implies that the 
post-repurchase improvement in agreement should be decreasing in the price elasticity of a firm’s share demand 
curve for a given repurchase magnitude. This prediction does not arise from the information asymmetry 
hypothesis with its flat demand curve. Following Gao and Ritter (2010), we measure the slope of the demand 
curve using an average daily order flow inverse price elasticity in a year. The daily order flow inverse price 
elasticity for each trading day is defined as the ratio between the absolute value of the stock’s raw return and its 
turnover (defined as the trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding). We then obtain the yearly 
price elasticity by taking the average of the daily elasticity over all the trading days in the year. A firm’s stock 
price is defined as being inelastic in a year if it falls below the sample median of that year. 
      We augment the model specification in Equation (11) by interacting the repurchase expense variable 
with the inelastic dummy defined above. The regression results are presented in Table 7. We find that the 
coefficients of the interaction term have signs consistent with those of the repurchase expense, and are 
statistically significant for all the three main agreement proxies. This finding indicates that, for any given 
repurchase size, the improvement in agreement is greater when the share demand curve is more inelastic. It thus 
further buttresses our disagreement hypothesis. 
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5.2.2. Investor-management Disagreement and Abnormal Stock Returns Following Repurchases 
      We also distinguish between our disagreement hypothesis and the information asymmetry hypothesis on 
the basis of their differing implications for the abnormal stock returns in both the short and the long run. The 
non-signaling information asymmetry hypothesis suggests that managers may exploit stock mispricing, 
engendered by investors’ lack of information, by buying back undervalued shares. But the repurchases do not 
change investor valuation of the firm unless they are a credible signal (but they are not, as discussed in the 
Introduction). In contrast, our disagreement hypothesis implies that an improvement in agreement leads to an 
increase in stock price. To the extent that the market assigns a positive probability that the announced 
repurchases will be subsequently implemented and thus computes a positive expected value for future 
improvements in agreement, we should observe positive abnormal stock returns upon announcements of 
repurchases. And a lower initial agreement level would lead to a greater expected improvement in agreement for 
a given size of a repurchase, implying a bigger announcement effect.  
      Our theory also predicts that the improvement in agreement will be realized only when firms actually 
implement the announced programs, not when they announce them. Further, as more shares are repurchased 
over time, agreement between investors and the manager will increase, and the intertemporal improvement in 
agreement will be reflected in the stock price, resulting in abnormal stock returns over a longer horizon 
(assuming that not all of the subsequent repurchase activity was completely anticipated at the announcement). 
That is, if firms do not implement the programs initially announced, we should not observe effects reflected in 
the long-run abnormal stock returns. But if they do implement the announced programs, then higher 
post-announcement abnormal returns will be associated with higher amounts of repurchases. Note that this 
argument does not require that investors be able to “observe” repurchases even ex post, since the source of the 
long-run returns is the actual increase in agreement, not any information conveyed by the repurchase. 
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      In sum, our disagreement hypothesis predicts that the market, in anticipation of the improvement in 
agreement, responds positively to a repurchase announcement regardless of whether the repurchase is actually 
implemented. In the long run, however, the increase in stock price will only be realized when the announced 
repurchase is implemented. Empirically, in testing the announcement effect, we exploit an institutional-feature 
distinction between privately-negotiated repurchases and open-market repurchases: firms may or may not 
subsequently implement the announced open-market repurchases, but will definitely implement the private 
repurchases. That is, holding agreement fixed, we should observe that the market responds more positively to 
the announcement of a private repurchase than to the announcement of an open-market repurchase because of 
the anticipated higher probability of implementation.       
      Due to its most complete coverage of our sample period 1987-2010, we take the sample corresponding 
to the proxy proposal submission measure of agreement when we examine the short-run and long-run stock 
price behavior following repurchases.
20
 We collect the repurchase announcements by the sample firms from 
SDC. Lie (2005) documents that most open-market repurchases take place within the quarter and the 
subsequent quarter of announcements, while Stephens and Weisbach (1998) suggest that an open-market 
repurchase program is usually completed within three years of the announcement. We therefore determine that, 
for open-market repurchases, the announced programs are actually implemented if firms repurchase shares in 
total of the size of at least 0.5% of the firms’ prior-year-end market capitalization during the year or/and the 
subsequent year of the announcements (based on the Compustat-based measures of net repurchases). Otherwise, 
the programs are thought of as being not implemented.
21
  
      Results reported in Table 8 strongly support our disagreement hypothesis. The univariate evidence of 
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 We also conduct a robustness check using the samples of the other two main agreement proxies. Our conclusion is not 
qualitatively affected. 
21
 We impose this more stringent criterion – 0.5% of the market capitalization – following the literature (e.g., Lie (2005) 
and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008)) to rule out the potential cases where firms have repurchased preferred stock and 
non-stock securities. Our results, however, are not affected by whether this criterion is imposed or not. 
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cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) around announcements in Panel A finds that the market responds 
positively upon the repurchase announcements in anticipation of the improvement in agreement, while it does 
not seem to distinguish whether the announced programs will be implemented. We then regress the CARs on 
Proxy Proposal as the agreement proxy while controlling for Breadth of ownership as the proxy for dispersion 
of opinion among investors, the announced repurchase program size, and other firm characteristics. The results 
in Column (1) in Panel B of Table 8 find that a lower level of initial agreement leads to higher announcement 
returns. We further regress the CARs on a private repurchase dummy that equals one if the announced 
repurchase is privately negotiated, and its interactions with both Proxy proposal and Breadth of ownership. In 
Column (2), we find that the agreement-private repurchase interaction is significantly positive, while the 
interaction of dispersion of opinion and private repurchase is not. That is, private repurchases announced 
following a lower agreement level, compared to otherwise similar open-market repurchases, experience 
significantly higher CARs. It suggests that the market expects a greater improvement in agreement with private 
repurchases than with open-market repurchases. Moreover, the market also responds more positively to larger 
announced program sizes in smaller firms.  
      Further, as shown in Panel A, we find significantly positive long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) following repurchase announcements on average, but the abnormal performance is limited to firms 
that actually implement the announced repurchases. The multivariate analysis of BHARs on the whole sample, 
as shown in the Column (3) of Panel B, suggests that the abnormal performance is positively related to how 
much the firms actually repurchase. And this relationship is not merely driven by the lack of significant 
performance in firms that do not implement the announced programs. As we show in the Column (4) of Panel B, 
among those firms that do actually implement the programs, better abnormal performance is associated with the 
firms that conduct larger repurchases.  
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      One may argue that a positive market response around the repurchase announcements and in the long 
run (with the market underreaction assumption) is also consistent with an agency-problem explanation. 
Investors may believe that the cash payout through repurchases mitigates the agency problem of free cash flow 
and thus reduces the likelihood of managers investing in negative-NPV projects to which they originally 
objected before the repurchases. We investigate this alternative explanation by regressing the announcement 
returns on a proxy for agency problems, the announced repurchase size, and their interaction, as well as other 
control variables used in the above tests. If the agency explanation holds, we should observe higher CARs 
associated with a larger announced repurchase size when the agency problem is more severe. Similarly, we 
conduct this test on the long-run abnormal returns while replacing the announced repurchase size with the 
actual repurchase size. We proxy for a firm’s agency problem by defining a dummy variable, which equals one 
if the number of anti-takeover provisions in a firm (that is, the GIM index in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003)) exceeds the sample median and the proportion of independent directors on its board is below the sample 
median. Intuitively, a firm is viewed as having a more severe agency problem if this dummy equals one. In 
untabulated results, we do not find any evidence in support of this agency explanation in either the 
announcement returns or the long-run abnormal returns.   
      In sum, the evidence provides stronger support for our disagreement hypothesis than other hypotheses. 
Moreover, while we do not rule out the market-timing hypothesis, our disagreement hypothesis has incremental 
power in explaining a firm’s repurchase decision.  
6. Discussions and Other Robustness Checks 
6.1. Executive Financial Incentives 
      One stream of research on corporate payout policy relates the surge in repurchases in the 1990s to the 
increased use of stock options to compensate management and employees or to reduce dilution from employee 
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stock option plans (e.g., Babenko (2009), Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002), and Weisbenner (2004)). In our 
study, we measure repurchases net of any associated stock reissuance used in employee stock ownership and 
executive stock option plans or used to fund a merger or other corporate activities. Thus, our disagreement 
explanation of repurchases is unlikely to be affected by dilution-reduction considerations. For robustness, 
however, we examine the impact of managers’ financial incentives on our disagreement explanation. 
      We measure managers’ financial incentives using the top five firm executives’ stock ownership and 
unexercised stock options that were vested and thus exercisable. We obtain data on these variables from 
ExecuComp, which results in a significant drop in sample size. We find that our results, untabulated for brevity, 
hold for all the agreement proxies. Further, consistent with the literature, the coefficients on management stock 
ownership are significantly negative while those on stock options are significantly positive, suggesting that 
managers are more likely to buy back shares when they have lower stock ownership and more unexercised 
(exercisable) stock options.   
6.2. Alternative Interpretations 
      The results strongly indicate that it is investor-management disagreement, rather than asymmetric 
information, that drives open-market repurchases. We now examine alternative interpretations of our results. 
The purpose is not to rule out these other interpretations per se, but rather to assess whether 
investor-management disagreement has incremental power to explain a firm’s open-market repurchase decision, 
relative to the other explanations. 
6.2.1. Financial Flexibility View 
      One influential view of why repurchases are preferred to dividends in a firm’s payout mix is the greater 
financial flexibility of repurchases (e.g., Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford 
(2000)). Prior evidence shows that firms with higher “temporary”, non-operating cash flows tend to choose 
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repurchases, while those with higher “permanent” operating cash flows pay dividends. Repurchasing firms are 
also shown to have more volatile cash flows. Thus, the relation between repurchase decisions and 
investor-management disagreement may be driven by a possible relation between cash flow volatility and 
disagreement.   
      To address this issue, we perform two checks. First, we control for operating cash flows and 
non-operating cash flows. The estimated coefficients, as shown in Table 2, take the expected signs and are 
highly significant in the different specifications. Second, in untabulated analysis, we focus on firms with 
below-median volatility of cash flows, and reexamine the relationship between repurchases and disagreement 
for this subset of firms. Volatility of cash flows is calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s cash flows 
over the past five years. We find that the relationship between disagreement and repurchase decisions is robust 
for this subset of firms. Overall, the results indicate that, even when financial flexibility is less likely to be a 
factor in driving a firm’s repurchase decision, the effect of investor-management disagreement persists.  
6.2.2. Growth Opportunities 
      Another potential concern is that the relationship between repurchase decisions and disagreement may 
arise simply because firms with limited growth opportunities may choose to repurchase in order to pay out cash 
that they do not need for investment. This argument is consistent with the survey evidence in Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and Michaely (2005), who suggest that managers make repurchase decisions after investment decisions. 
To the extent that this is true, the documented relationship between investor-management disagreement and 
repurchases may merely be a reflection of a firm’s limited investment opportunities.  
      This issue is partly addressed by the fact that we control for investment opportunities using 
market-to-book ratios. However, because the market-to-book ratio is an imprecise proxy for investment 
opportunities, interpretation of the results is a little murky. To tackle this measurement issue, we follow Datta, 
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Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) and use the preceding three-year sales growth of a firm as an additional 
proxy for investment opportunities. In particular, we split the sample into high- and low-growth groups based 
on this new proxy, and then we repeat the baseline analysis replacing market-to-book with the new proxy.  
      In untabulated analysis, we find that for firms in the low-growth group, the results hold for our main 
agreement proxies. Further, for the firms in the high-growth group, the effect of disagreement on repurchases 
remains. These findings suggest that investor-management disagreement is not specific to low-growth firms, 
because if it were, we would not see any impact of disagreement in high-growth firms. These results suggest 
that while a repurchase may be used as a conventional payout mechanism by low-growth firms that wish to 
disgorge excess cash, it is also used strategically to improve agreement between investors and management, 
regardless of the firm’s growth prospects.               
7. Conclusion 
      In this paper we develop a new theoretical explanation for open-market and privately-negotiated share 
repurchases and provide supporting empirical evidence. We also provide a link between a firm’s share 
repurchase decision and its investment decision. When investors disagree with management about investment 
decisions, the firm’s stock price is adversely affected. However, by repurchasing shares, a firm causes 
ownership to concentrate in the hands of investors more likely to agree with management, as investors less 
prone to agree with management tender their shares when the firm repurchases. This positively affects the 
firm’s stock price. We thus posit that sufficiently low investor-management disagreement triggers a repurchase. 
Our empirical evidence strongly supports this motive for stock repurchases. We also distinguish empirically 
between this disagreement explanation and other explanations like agency and non-signaling-related 
information-asymmetry motivations, and document that our findings are robust.  
      In the previous literature (e.g., Allen and Gate (1999), Dittmar and Thakor (2007), and Van den Steen 
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(2004, 2010b)), the extent of disagreement has been taken as exogenously given. Our findings show that firms 
may take steps to strategically affect the level of agreement through initiatives like repurchases. Future research 





























Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Share Repurchases 
      Following the approach taken in Fama and French (2001) and Skinner (2008), our measure of share 
repurchases nets out stock reissuances used in employee stock ownership and executive stock option plans or in 
payment to fund acquisition or other corporate activities.
22
 Specifically, if the firm uses the treasury stock 
method for repurchases, we measure repurchases for year t as the change in common treasury stock (Compustat 
item 226) from year t-1 to year t. If the firm uses the retirement method instead, which is inferred from treasury 
stock equal to zero in the current and prior years, we take repurchases for year t to be the difference between 
purchases (Compustat item 115) and sales (Compustat item 108) of common and preferred stock in year t. If 
either of these amounts is negative, we set repurchases to zero. Since we are focusing on open-market and 
privately-negotiated repurchases in this study, in firm-years with positive calculated repurchases under the 
above approach, we set repurchases to zero in the identical firm-years where self-tender offer or Dutch auction 
repurchases are identified to have occurred according to SDC.
23
 
      In the analysis where we need to distinguish between open-market and privately-negotiated repurchases, 
we follow Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) in identifying the subsample of privately-negotiated repurchases. 
Specifically, we collect all these repurchases from SDC’s database on mergers and acquisitions with complete 
information on the announcement date, the repurchase price per share, and the fraction of shares repurchased. 
We further require, as their study does, that no other repurchase programs are announced simultaneously. 
                                                        
22
 By using net repurchases instead of raw repurchases, we focus on repurchases that are less likely to be motivated by 
undoing the EPS dilution associated with stock options (e.g., Kahle (2002) and Weisbenner (2004)) or by funding firms’ 
acquisitions or pension plans.   
23 
Identifying an accurate measure of repurchases is empirically difficult. Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008) find higher error 
rates in commonly used estimators of share repurchases. Our measure here is an approximation of open-market and 
privately-negotiated repurchases, as it may also include repurchases of securities other than common stock. Despite being 
rare, we may have also omitted those open-market or privately-negotiated repurchases made in the same year of self-tender 
offer or Dutch auction repurchases. However, the prior literature (e.g., Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan, 
Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), and Grullon and Michaely (2002)) suggests that transactions other than open-market 




(i) Whether a firm receives one or more proxy proposals in a given year: 
      When investors disagree, they may press for changes through private negotiations with management. 
But if management is not sufficiently responsive or the negotiation fails, investors may submit proxy proposals 
for a shareholder vote. Our first proxy for agreement exploits this idea. The literature (e.g., Gillan and Starks 
(2000), Renneboog and Szilagyi (2008), and Thomas and Cotter (2007)) shows that public and union pension 
funds, investment firms, and coordinated investors are among the most active sponsors of proxy proposals. The 
issues addressed in such proposals include, but are not limited to, shareholder voting, takeovers, selection of 
directors, executive compensation, and the sale of the company. Despite the non-binding nature of voting on 
shareholder proxy proposals, proposal submission sponsored by shareholders is a conspicuous sign of 
investor-management disagreement. We capture such disagreement using a dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm receives one or more shareholder proxy proposals in a given year and zero otherwise.
 24
      
      Of course, we are not suggesting that an absence of shareholder proxy proposals implies that investors’ 
beliefs are always aligned with the firm’s management. Some unobservable factors may prevent investors from 
choosing to submit proxy proposals in some firms at any time when they disagree with management. Therefore, 
we do not make cross-sectional comparisons to examine whether investors in some firms are more likely to 
disagree with management than investors in other firms on the basis of whether or not they submit proxy 
proposals. Rather, we focus on firms that have received at least one shareholder proxy proposal over the sample 
period. And we argue that investors are more likely to disagree with management in the years they submit proxy 
proposals than in the years in which they do not. Our final sample in using shareholder proxy proposal as an 
agreement proxy covers 1198 firms and 16295 firm-years from 1987 to 2010.  
                                                        
24
 Proxy proposals can be broadly classified into two types: governance-related vs. social responsibility-related (typically 
submitted by religious/socially responsible investors). In this study, we focus on the former type only.  
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(ii) Vote recommendations in director election: 
      Our second and third proxies for agreement exploit the fact that shareholders can signal their 
disagreement with management in the case of director elections. Before a director election, some investors may 
organize a campaign against one or more director candidates to be elected, encouraging fellow shareholders via 
letters, press release, or internet communications to withhold votes for the candidate(s). Such 
shareholder-initiated “just vote no” campaigns are augmented more recently by “vote no” recommendations 
issued by third-party proxy advisors like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). From the data provided by 
Voting Analytics (a product of ISS), every year since 2003, ISS issues vote recommendations for all director 
candidates who are up for election in most of the Russell 1000 firms and many of the Russell 2000 firms. The 
recommendations are either “for” or “withhold” (“against”). 
      Therefore, our second agreement proxy relates to the extent of which a firm’s director candidates will 
receive objections from shareholders or independent proxy advisors before the election. To account for the 
difference in the number of director candidates who are up for election in different firm-years, we define the 
measure as the proportion of director candidates receiving a “withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS 
or/and certain shareholders in a “just vote no” campaign, among all candidates in the firm who are up for 
election in a given year. The greater the magnitude of this measure, the more likely are shareholders to disagree 
with management. Note that this measure takes most weight from the ISS recommendation, because 
shareholders’ “just vote no” campaigns are still relatively rarely observed despite their increasing popularity 
since inception in 1990.
25
 And in most cases of shareholder campaigns against certain candidates, ISS is 
observed to issue “withhold” or “against” recommendation on these candidates too. Our final sample in using 
this agreement measure spans 2546 firms and 14828 firm-years during 2003-2010, a period when ISS has full 
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 Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) identify 112 “just vote no” campaigns from 1990 to 2003, while we find 186 
such campaigns from 2004 to 2010.  
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coverage of director vote recommendations. 
(iii) Actual voting in director elections 
      The third proxy considers actual shareholder voting during the director election. Intuitively, 
shareholders may express their disagreement by withholding votes for or voting against certain candidates in 
the election of directors. Candidates are normally elected with high “for” votes. For instance, Cai, Garner, and 
Walkling (2009) find that an average director across all firms receives just over 94% of the “for” votes for the 
period of 2003-2005. Given the high percentage of “for” votes in normal times, an even slightly lower vote may 
signal shareholders’ disagreement. We therefore define a disagreement proxy as a dummy that equals one when 
at least one director candidate in a firm receives a below-the-sample-median “for” votes in a given year, and 
zero otherwise, where the sample median is the median vote of all director candidates for all firms in that year. 
Alternatively, we define the third proxy as the proportion of director candidates receiving 
below-the-sample-median “for” votes in a given firm-year; all the results are qualitatively similar with this 
alternative measure. The final sample with the third agreement proxy covers 2351 firms and 9748 firm-years 
from 2003 to 2010.
26
  
(iv) Dual-class control premium: 
      Following Dittmar and Thakor (2007), we use the control premium for dual-class stock as an alternative 
proxy for agreement. Due to limited data availability, however, we focus on the three proxies discussed above 
and use this proxy only in a robustness check. 
      Firms with dual-class ownership structures typically have two share classes that have equal cash flow 
rights but the insider-held voting stock has more voting or control rights and thus trades at a premium relative to 
the widely-held non-voting stock. The difference in the prices at which voting and non-voting shares trade 
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 This sample size is smaller than that of the vote recommendation sample due to the missing information in actual votes 
for many firm-years. 
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represents the value of voting. Of course, the right to vote has value only if there is a non-zero probability that 
one may vote against management. A shareholder who is certain to endorse every managerial decision has no 
reason to pay extra for the right to vote. In contrast, the more likely a shareholder is to disagree with 
management, the higher the value the shareholder will attach to the right to vote. Thus, we predict that a 
dual-class firm is more likely to conduct open-market repurchases when the control premium is higher. 
      To measure a firm’s control premium, we need to have the prices of the two classes of stock and hence 
we focus on firms with dual-class stock when both classes trade. After imposing the sampling restrictions as 
discussed in Section 3.1, we obtain a sample of 141 firms with dual-class stock trading in 995 firm-years. Using 
CRSP monthly pricing data, we measure the control premium as the superior stock price minus the inferior 
stock price divided by the inferior stock price for a given month. We then take the average of the monthly 
premium for each firm-year to arrive at an annual control premium for the firm. For robustness, we also use the 
median of the monthly premium; we find that the results are largely unaffected.  
      Dittmar and Thakor (2007) argue persuasively that the dual-class control premium is more appropriately 
viewed as a proxy for investor-management disagreement than as a proxy for agency problems. Nevertheless, 
we conduct a further check of whether agency problems can explain the control premium. In cross-sectional 
studies, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009), and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) suggest that managers are 
more prone to pursue private benefits at shareholders’ expense and thus firm value is lower when the divergence 
between insider control rights and cash flow rights is greater. We thus examine whether the intertemporal 
variation of the control premium can be explained by the intertemporally varying degrees of divergence 
between control rights and cash flow rights within a firm. We find that the magnitude of the divergence between 
control and cash flow rights changes far less than does the control premium over time in a firm. Therefore, the 
within-firm variation in the control premium is unlikely to be due to agency problems for which we can control 
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in a firm-fixed-effect estimation. Besides the data availability limitation, a concern with this control premium 
measure for agreement is that it is derived from the firm’s stock price, making it somewhat difficult to 
disentangle our agreement hypothesis from the market-timing hypothesis. We try to address this issue by 







 Actual repurchase size is defined as follows: for open-market repurchases, the total repurchase expense 
during the two years as a percentage of the firm’s market capitalization as of the year end prior to the 
announcement; for private repurchases, since they are always implemented within a short time period 
following the announcements, we use the announced amount (or number of shares to be repurchased) in 
determining the actual repurchase size. 
 Analysts’ forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings-per-share forecasts, 
denominated by the absolute value of the mean forecast. 
 Announced program size is the announced repurchase size as a percentage of the firm’s market 
capitalization as of the prior fiscal year end (or as a percentage of the firm’s total number of shares 
outstanding if the number of shares to be repurchased is announced). 
 BHARs are the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) relative to control firms for a period of two years 
following the repurchase announcements (to be roughly consistent with the actual repurchase measurement 
period). They are defined following Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999). The control firms are matched on size, 
book-to-market, and prior six-month returns.  
 Breadth of ownership is defined, following Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), as the number of mutual funds who 
hold a long position in the stock in the quarter as of (or immediately before) the fiscal year end, divided by the 
total number of all available mutual funds reporting in the same quarter. 
 Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets. 
                                                        
27
 Recall that the stock price in our model depends on both manager-investor agreement and the noise term ε. 
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 CARs are the two-day (-1, 0) cumulative abnormal stock returns around repurchase announcements, 
estimated with the market model. 
 Debt ratio is the long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
 Earnings residual (std) is the standard deviation of the three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns 
around quarterly earnings announcements over the past five years. 
 Frequency is the proportion of years that a firm has positive net repurchase in the sample period. 
 Inelastic demand curve is a dummy which equals one if the firm’s price elasticity in a year is above the 
sample median of that year and zero otherwise. A firm’s price elasticity is the average daily order flow 
inverse price elasticity in a year, defined as the ratio between the absolute value of the stock’s raw return and 
its turnover (the trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding). 
 Non-operating income is the ratio of non-operating income (Compustat item 61) to the book value of total 
assets. 
 Operating income is the ratio of operating income to the book value of total assets. 
 Repurchase expense is the dollar amount of net repurchase if it is positive, divided by the book value of 
total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. 
 Sales (log) is the log of sales. 
 Short interest is the monthly average relative short interest ratio (short interest divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding) in a year. 
 Volatility is the idiosyncratic volatility of the stock’s return in the year, which is the standard deviation of 
residuals obtained from regressing the firm’s raw daily stock return on the contemporaneous 
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Panel A reports summary statistics for the four measures of investor-management agreement: Proxy proposal, a 
dummy that equals one if a firm receives one or more proxy proposals in a given year and zero otherwise; Voting 
recommendation, the proportion of director candidates receiving a vote-no recommendation from ISS or certain 
shareholders in a vote-no campaign, among all candidates in the firm who are up for the election in a given year; 
Actual voting, a dummy that equals one if there are one or more director candidates who are up for election and 
receiving fewer votes than the sample median in a given year, and zero otherwise; and Dual-class control premium, 
the mean difference in monthly stock price between voting and non-voting shares in a firm-year divided by the price 
of non-voting shares. Panel B provides summary statistics of share repurchases and firm characteristics for an 
unbalanced panel of 1198 firms from 1987 to 2010 (16295 firm-years) that have received at least one or more 
shareholder proxy proposals during the sample period. Frequency is the proportion of years that a firm has positive 
net repurchase in the sample period. Repurchase expense is the dollar amount of net repurchase if it is positive, 
divided by the book value of total assets as of the prior year end. Other firm-level accounting variables and stock 
returns, presented as of the year prior to repurchase, are self-explanatory. 
 
 Mean Median Standard   N      
   Deviation  
Panel A: Measures of Investor-Management Agreement 
Proxy proposal 0.21 0 0.41 16295 
Voting recommendation 0.09 0 0.21 14828 
Actual voting 0.66 1 0.47 9748 
Dual-class control premium 0.03 0.01 0.15 995 
Panel B: Repurchase and Firm characteristics 
Frequency 0.364 0.333 0.268 1198 
Repurchase expense 0.043 0.024 0.05 6320 
Sales ($MM) 5596.82 1313.14 16492.04 16295 
Operating income 0.14 0.14 0.09 16295 
Non-operating income 0.01 0.01 0.01 16295 
Capital expenditure 0.06 0.05 0.05 16295 
Market-to-book 3.09 2.17 3.03 16295 
Debt ratio 0.19 0.17 0.15 16295 




The Effect of Agreement on the Repurchase Decision: Baseline Regressions 
 
This table presents results from firm fixed-effect regressions (columns of odd numbers) and Logit regressions (columns of even numbers) where the dependent 
variable equals one if the firm makes repurchase in year t and zero otherwise. The investor-management agreement proxy used in each regression is indicated at the 
top of the table. Four measures of agreement are used: Proxy proposal, a dummy that equals one if a firm receives one or more proxy proposals in a given year and 
zero otherwise; Voting recommendation, the proportion of director candidates receiving a vote-no recommendation from ISS or certain shareholders in a vote-no 
campaign, among all candidates in the firm who are up for the election in a given year; Actual voting, a dummy that equals one if there are one or more director 
candidates who are up for election and receiving fewer votes than the sample median in a given year, and zero otherwise; and Dual-class control premium, the mean 
difference in monthly stock price between voting and non-voting shares in a firm-year divided by the price of non-voting shares. All other control variables are 
defined in the Appendix and are measured as of the year prior to repurchase. Coefficients of the marginal effect are reported in the Logit regressions. All regressions 
include year and industry dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered by industry-year and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
        
 Agreement Proxies 
 Proxy Proposal Voting Recommendation Actual Voting Dual-class Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Agreementt-1            0.035*** 0.036*** 0.049** 0.051*** 0.038** 0.057*** 0.410*** 0.534*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.016) (0.007) (0.020) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) 
Stock return t-1 -0.034*** -0.066*** 0.002 -0.041*** 0.015 -0.044*** -0.064** -0.143*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.807) (0.000) (0.134) (0.001) (0.049) (0.003) 
Operating income t-1 0.700*** 1.318*** 0.295*** 1.088*** 0.302*** 1.168*** 0.508 0.896*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.286) (0.004) 
Non-operating income t-1 1.918*** 2.905*** 1.101*** 2.933*** 0.460 2.474*** -0.141 1.122 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.400) (0.000) (0.955) (0.538) 
Capital expenditure t-1 -0.725*** -1.296*** -0.311** -1.359*** -0.412** -1.486*** -0.237 -0.887** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.625) (0.012) 
Market-to-book t-1 -0.004* -0.007*** -0.000 0.002 0.005* 0.005** -0.024* -0.011 
 (0.071) (0.000) (0.965) (0.199) (0.090) (0.017) (0.089) (0.189) 
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Debt ratio t-1 -0.527*** -0.426*** -0.573*** -0.367*** -0.683*** -0.381*** -0.345 -0.355*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.006) 
Sales t-1 (log) 0.088*** 0.060*** 0.067*** 0.074*** 0.122*** 0.073*** 0.073 0.061*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.221) (0.000) 
Firm-fixed-effect Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 16295 16272 14828 14810 9748 9728 953 930 

























The Effect of Repurchase on Agreement 
 
This table presents results from Logit regressions (Columns (1) and (3)) and firm fixed-effect 
regressions (Columns (2) and (4)) of the impact of repurchase on the change in agreement. The 
dependent variables, defined as follows, are the changes in the four agreement proxies which are 
indicated at the top of columns: a dummy which equals one if a firm receives one or more proxy 
proposals in year t-1 but not in year t+1, and zero otherwise; change in the proportion of director 
candidates receiving a vote-no recommendation from ISS or certain shareholders in a vote-no 
campaign from year t-1 to year t+1; a dummy that equals one if there are at least one director 
candidate receiving fewer votes than the sample median in year t-1 and no director candidates 
receive fewer votes than the sample median in year t+1, and zero otherwise; and change, from 
year t-1 to year t+1, in the mean difference in monthly stock price between voting and non-voting 
shares in a firm-year divided by the price of non-voting shares. Repurchase expense is the dollar 
amount of net repurchase at year t if it is positive, divided by the book value of total assets as of 
the prior year end. Coefficients of the marginal effect are reported in the Logit regressions. All 
regressions include year and industry dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
industry-year in the Logit regressions and by firm in the firm-fixed-effect regressions, and 















(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Repurchase expense 0.187*** -0.198*** 0.057** -0.397** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.019) (0.047) 
Stock return  0.008 -0.007 0.002 0.036 
 
(0.159) (0.204) (0.578) (0.273) 
Operating performance  -0.085*** 0.037 0.002 -0.101 
 
(0.006) (0.396) (0.893) (0.456) 
CAPX -0.110** -0.120* 0.034 -0.143* 
 
(0.048) (0.058) (0.259) (0.089) 
Market-to-book -0.003*** 0.002* -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.070) (0.897) (0.829) 
Sales (log) 0.013*** 0.009 -0.004*** 0.026 
 
(0.000) (0.308) (0.000) (0.245) 
Observations 16148 14797 6813 848 


















The Choice between Open-market Repurchases and 
Privately-negotiated Repurchases 
 
This table presents results from ordered Logit regressions where the dependent variable equals one 
if the firm makes open-market repurchase in year t, two if the firm makes privately-negotiated 
repurchases in year t, and zero otherwise. The investor-management agreement proxy used in each 
regression is indicated at the top of the table. Four measures of agreement are used: Proxy 
proposal, a dummy that equals one if a firm receives one or more proxy proposals in a given year 
and zero otherwise; Voting recommendation, the proportion of director candidates receiving a 
vote-no recommendation from ISS or certain shareholders in a vote-no campaign, among all 
candidates in the firm who are up for the election in a given year; Actual voting, a dummy that 
equals one if there are one or more director candidates who are up for election and receiving fewer 
votes than the sample median in a given year, and zero otherwise; and Dual-class control premium, 
the mean difference in monthly stock price between voting and non-voting shares in a firm-year 
divided by the price of non-voting shares. All other control variables are defined in the Appendix 
and are measured as of the year prior to repurchase. All regressions include year and industry 
dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered by industry-year and p-values are reported 














(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agreementt-1            0.132*** 0.262*** 0.246*** 2.407*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Stock return t-1 -0.263*** -0.185*** -0.183*** -0.603*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) 
Operating income t-1 5.378*** 4.839*** 4.831*** 4.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
Non-operating income t-1 11.874*** 12.906*** 10.121*** 3.247 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.692) 
Capital expenditure t-1 -5.501*** -6.065*** -6.202*** -4.505*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Market-to-book t-1 -0.030*** 0.009 0.019** -0.047 
 (0.000) (0.203) (0.019) (0.234) 
Debt ratio t-1 -1.697*** -1.583*** -1.502*** -1.592*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Sales t-1 (log) 0.249*** 0.323*** 0.296*** 0.263*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 16295 14828 9748 953 





The Effect of Difference of Opinions among Investors on the Repurchase Decision  
This table presents results from Logit regressions where the dependent variable equals one if the firm makes repurchase in year t and zero otherwise. The 
investor-management agreement proxy used in each regression is indicated at the top of the table. Four measures of agreement are used: Proxy proposal, a dummy 
that equals one if a firm receives one or more proxy proposals in a given year and zero otherwise; Voting recommendation, the proportion of director candidates 
receiving a vote-no recommendation from ISS or certain shareholders in a vote-no campaign, among all candidates in the firm who are up for the election in a given 
year; Actual voting, a dummy that equals one if there are one or more director candidates who are up for election and receiving fewer votes than the sample median in 
a given year, and zero otherwise; and Dual-class control premium, the mean difference in monthly stock price between voting and non-voting shares in a firm-year 
divided by the price of non-voting shares. Breadth of ownership is defined, following Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), as the number of mutual funds who hold a long 
position in the stock in the quarter as of (or immediately before) the fiscal year end, divided by the total number of all available mutual funds reporting in the same 
quarter. Volatility is the idiosyncratic volatility of the stock’s return in the year. Analysts’ forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings-per-share 
forecasts, denominated by the absolute value of the mean forecast. Short interest is the monthly average relative short interest (the ratio of short interest to number of 
shares outstanding) in a year. Other control variables used in Table 2 are included but not reported here for the sake of brevity. Coefficients of the marginal effect are 
reported. All regressions include year and industry dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered by industry-year and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Agreement Proxies 
 Proxy Proposal Voting Recommendation Actual Voting Dual-class Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Agreementt-1            0.029*** 0.028** 0.060*** 0.050** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.614*** 0.707* 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.002) (0.030) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.075) 


































Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15922 12931 14735 12096 9720 8732 839 233 
Pseudo R-squared 0.129 0.140 0.148 0.152 0.135 0.142 0.189 0.264 




The Effect of Agreement on the Repurchase Decision: Controls for Information Asymmetry 
 
This table presents results from Logit regressions when two measures of information asymmetry, Volatility, and Earnings residual (std), are included in the baseline 
regressions in Table 2, respectively. The dependent variable equals one if the firm makes repurchase in year t and zero otherwise. The investor-management 
agreement proxy used in each regression is indicated at the top of the table. Four measures of agreement are used: Proxy proposal, a dummy that equals one if a firm 
receives one or more proxy proposals in a given year and zero otherwise; Voting recommendation, the proportion of director candidates receiving a vote-no 
recommendation from ISS or certain shareholders in a vote-no campaign, among all candidates in the firm who are up for the election in a given year; Actual voting, 
a dummy that equals one if there are one or more director candidates who are up for election and receiving fewer votes than the sample median in a given year, and 
zero otherwise; and Dual-class control premium, the mean difference in monthly stock price between voting and non-voting shares in a firm-year divided by the price 
of non-voting shares. Volatility is the idiosyncratic volatility of the stock’s return in the year. Earnings residual (std) is the standard deviation of the three-day (-1, +1) 
cumulative abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements over the past five years. Other control variables used in Table 2 are included but not reported 
here for the sake of brevity. Coefficients of the marginal effect are reported. All regressions include year and industry dummy variables. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by industry-year and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Idiosyncratic volatility as information asymmetry measure 
 Agreement Proxies 
 Proxy Proposal Voting Recommendation Actual Voting Dual-class Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















Volatility t-1 -7.502*** -7.516*** -6.927*** -6.953*** -10.234*** -10.262*** -1.494 -1.754 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.324) (0.255) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16271 16271 14803 14803 9728 9728 930 930 






Panel B: Earnings residual (sd) as information asymmetry measure 
 Agreement Proxies 
 Proxy Proposal Voting Recommendation Actual Voting Dual-class Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















Earnings residual (std) t-1 -1.823*** -1.827*** -1.366*** -1.370*** -1.581*** -1.593*** -0.073 -0.328 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.965) (0.848) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13889 13889 12997 12997 9270 9270 272 272 








The Effect of Repurchase on Agreement: The Impact of Price 
Elasticity 
 
This table presents results from Logit regressions (Columns (1) and (3)) and firm fixed-effect 
regressions (Columns (2) and (4)) of the impact of repurchase size and price elasticity on the 
change in agreement. The dependent variables, defined as follows, are the changes in the four 
agreement proxies which are indicated at the top of columns: a dummy which equals one if a firm 
receives one or more proxy proposals in year t-1 but not in year t+1, and zero otherwise; change in 
the proportion of director candidates receiving a vote-no recommendation from ISS or certain 
shareholders in a vote-no campaign from year t-1 to year t+1; a dummy that equals one if there are 
at least one director candidate receiving fewer votes than the sample median in year t-1 and all 
director candidates receive no fewer votes than the sample median in year t+1, and zero otherwise; 
and change, from year t-1 to year t+1, in the mean difference in monthly stock price between 
voting and non-voting shares in a firm-year divided by the price of non-voting shares. Repurchase 
expense is the dollar amount of net repurchase at year t if it is positive, divided by the book value 
of total assets as of the prior year end. Inelastic demand curve is a dummy which equals one if the 
firm’s price elasticity in a year is above the sample median of that year and zero otherwise. A firm’s 
price elasticity is the average daily order flow inverse price elasticity in a year, defined as the ratio 
between the absolute value of the stock’s raw return and its turnover (the trading volume divided by 
the number of shares outstanding). Coefficients of the marginal effect are reported in the Logit 
regressions. All regressions include year and industry dummy variables. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by industry-year and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 













Repurchase expense 0.130** -0.163** 0.048* -0.362* 
 
(0.023) (0.034) (0.091) (0.072) 
Inelastic demand curve -0.016*** 0.003 -0.001 0.009 
 
(0.001) (0.737) (0.745) (0.617) 
Repurchase expense * 
Inelastic demand curve 0.240** -0.401*** 0.112** -0.522 
 
(0.022) (0.004) (0.015) (0.241) 
Stock return  0.008 -0.006 0.002 0.038 
 
(0.120) (0.263) (0.580) (0.302) 
Operating performance  -0.083*** 0.046 0.001 -0.231 
 
(0.007) (0.285) (0.930) (0.118) 
CAPX -0.119** -0.130* 0.038 -0.309** 
 
(0.033) (0.091) (0.203) (0.020) 
Market-to-book -0.003*** 0.002 0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.209) (0.980) (0.761) 
Sales (log) 0.012*** 0.008 -0.004*** 0.029 
 
(0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.147) 
Observations 16122 14764 6777 738 








Repurchases and Abnormal Stock Returns  
 
This table reports evidence on the short-run and long-run abnormal stock returns.  
    Panel A presents univariate results of the two-day (-1, 0) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
around the repurchase announcements and the two-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
following the announcements for the whole sample and two subsamples of whether the announced 
repurchase programs are actually implemented. All announced privately negotiated repurchases 
are implemented by definition. For open-market repurchases, it is determined that the announced 
programs are actually implemented if firms repurchase shares in total of the size of at least 0.5% 
of the firms’ prior-year-end market capitalization during the year or/and the subsequent year of the 
announcements (based on the Compustat-based measures of net repurchases). Otherwise, the 
programs are thought of as being not implemented.  
    Panel B presents results of OLS regressions of CARs and BHARs. The dependent variable is 
the CARs in the first column where the whole sample of firms is estimated. The dependent 
variables are the BHARs in the last two columns, where the overall sample and the subsample of 
firms that actually implement the announced repurchase programs are used, respectively. The 
agreement proxy used here is the proxy proposal dummy that equals one if a firm receives one or 
more proxy proposals in a given year and zero otherwise. Announced program size is the 
announced repurchase size as a percentage of the firm’s market capitalization as of the prior year 
end. Actual repurchase size is the actual repurchase expense in the year and the subsequent year of 
the announcement, denominated by the firm’s market capitalization as of the prior year end; it is 
zero if no repurchases are made in the two years. Private repurchase is a dummy that equals one 
for privately negotiated repurchases and zero for open-market repurchases. Breadth of ownership 
is defined, following Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), as the number of mutual funds who hold a 
long position in the stock in the quarter as of (or immediately before) the fiscal year end, divided 
by the total number of all available mutual funds reporting in the same quarter. All regressions 
include year and industry dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered by industry-year 










CARs Mean 0.84*** 0.92*** 0.65*** 
 
Median 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.52*** 
 
Obs. 3180 2501 679 
 
 
   BHARs Mean 6.16*** 8.75*** -0.16 
 
Median 1.89** 2.06** 0.26 
 
Obs. 3051 2430 621 
 
 














 Panel B: Multivariate regressions of CARs and BHARs 
 











(1) (2) (3) (4) 











Stock return t-1 -0.005 -0.005* -0.037 -0.063 
 (0.101) (0.097) (0.553) (0.434) 
Sales t-1 (log) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.021 -0.035** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.130) (0.031) 
Debt ratio t-1 -0.002 -0.003 -0.062 -0.163 
 (0.809) (0.703) (0.710) (0.395) 
Operating income t-1 0.002 0.002 0.877** 0.458 
 (0.898) (0.899) (0.015) (0.252) 
Non-operating income t-1 0.142 0.130 2.541 1.445 
 (0.109) (0.141) (0.200) (0.546) 
Market-to-book t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.010 
 (0.818) (0.800) (0.566) (0.275) 
Capital expenditure t-1 -0.016 -0.013 0.332 0.067 
 (0.611) (0.676) (0.587) (0.927) 
Agreementt-1            0.005** 0.004* 
  
 (0.027) (0.064) 
  Private repurchaset  0.007 
  
  (0.263) 
  Agreementt-1*Private 
repurchaset  0.019* 
  
  (0.071) 
  Breadth of ownershipt-1 0.038 0.042* 
  
 (0.125) (0.083) 
  Breadth of 
ownershipt-1*Private 
repurchaset  -0.065 
  
  (0.442) 
  Observations 3175 3175 3051 2430 
R-squared 0.045 0.049 0.040 0.049 
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